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 ANOTHER THORN IN THE  
“SEMANTIC BRIAR PATCH”  
OF THE HANGING PARAGRAPH:1 
IS NEGATIVE EQUITY A PURCHASE MONEY 
SECURITY INTEREST? 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In August 2006, Lisa Kay Weiser purchased a 2006 Toyota RAV4 for 
around $30,000.
2
  When Lisa discovered that she could not afford the 
payments on the RAV4, she traded it in for a 2006 Pontiac G6 at Van 
Chevrolet.  The ―sticker‖ price of the Pontiac was $14,434.50.  Van Chevrolet 
gave Lisa $21,000 as a trade-in allowance for the RAV4, leaving a balance of 
$9,031.64 due and owing on her loan to Toyota Motor Finance for the RAV4.  
Van Chevrolet added this amount to Lisa‘s loan for the Pontiac, along with 
$2,555 for an extended warranty and $750 for ―gap‖ insurance.3  Lisa 
financed a total of $26,771.14 at 10.55% interest, payable in seventy-five 
monthly installments of $491.13 each.  Shortly after the transaction, Van 
Chevrolet assigned its interest in the loan to Community America. 
Lisa filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy protection on March 12, 2007.  
Community America filed a claim for $28,251.24.
4
  In her Chapter 13 plan, 
Lisa proposed to pay $15,295 (the current value of the Pontiac) as a secured 
claim to Community America, and the remainder of the balance due to 
Community America would be paid as an unsecured claim.  Community 
America objected to confirmation of Lisa‘s plan, arguing that it was entitled 
to full payment of its claim under § 1325(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
5
  A 
provision in § 1325(a) disallows the sort of bifurcation that Lisa proposed for 
Community America‘s claim.  The provision applies if the claim is a purchase 
money security interest on a personal vehicle purchased within 910 days of 
 
1. Courts and commentators have given the ―hanging paragraph‖ in 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) many 
scurrilous nicknames.  This particular one was given by Judge Dunn in In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 
238 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007). 
2. The facts are taken from In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 265 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007).  These 
facts represent the typical situation where a debtor finances negative equity with her new car loan, 
and this Comment will refer to the same factual scenario throughout. 
3. Gap insurance covers the difference between a car‘s value and the amount owed to the 
lienholder if the car were to be destroyed in an accident or by other means.  In re Weiser, 381 B.R. at 
265 n.1. 
4. Presumably, the claim includes amounts for interest, late charges, and attorney‘s fees.  Lisa 
did not object to the amount of the claim. 
5. The Bankruptcy Code is contained in Title 11 of the United States Code.  Future statutory 
references are to the 2006 version of Title 11, unless otherwise indicated. 
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the bankruptcy filing.  The dispute in Lisa‘s case centered on whether 
Community America had a purchase money security interest in the $9,031.64 
it financed for the remaining amount due on the RAV4 loan (called ―negative 
equity‖).6  The bankruptcy court ruled that it was and that Lisa‘s Chapter 13 
plan had to provide for payment of Community America‘s entire claim. 
The issue of whether a creditor has a purchase money security interest in 
the negative equity portion of a car loan prompted a great deal of litigation.  
The early majority of bankruptcy courts held that negative equity was not a 
purchase money security interest.
7
  But as the decisions were appealed, nearly 
every circuit court to hear the issue has held that negative equity can form the 
basis for a purchase money security interest.  As of this writing, eight of the 
nine circuit courts to consider the issue have held that negative equity from a 
trade-in that is rolled into a loan for the purchase of a new car is purchase 
money debt that is not subject to bifurcation under § 1325(a).
8
  The Ninth 
Circuit came to the opposite conclusion, however, and two of the circuit 
decisions drew vigorous dissents.
9
  Despite the clear majority in the circuit 
 
6. Negative equity is the term used for the amount by which the debt exceeds the value of the 
collateral at the time of the trade-in.  In re Callicott, 386 B.R. 232, 236 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2008); see 
also In re Hampton, No. 07-14990, 2008 Bankr. LEXIS 2551, at *5 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio June 16, 
2008) (―‗Negative equity‘ is . . . the amount by which the outstanding loan balance . . . exceeds the 
value of the trade-in vehicle.‖). 
7. 2 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER 
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ¶ 12.05[10][b], at 12-113 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009); see also 
In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Hernandez, 388 B.R. 883, 885 
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); In re Padgett, 389 
B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008); In re Callicott, 386 B.R. 232, 237 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 2008); 
In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 582 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 2007); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 672–73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Sanders, 377 
B.R. 836, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); 
In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 154 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 741 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 
623 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). 
8. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 2010); Howard 
v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 858 (7th Cir. 2010); Reiber v. GMAC, 
LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009); Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 
F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 
740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286 
(10th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 629 (4th Cir. 
2009); Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008).  The 
Second Circuit certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals, which held that the negative 
equity was a purchase money security interest.  Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 
387, 388 (N.Y. 2009). 
9. Americredit Fin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14588 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010); In re Mierkowski, 580 F.3d at 743 (Bye, J., dissenting); In re Ford, 
574 F.3d at 1286 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting); see also Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott), 
580 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 2009) (Bye, J., concurring) (Judge Bye indicated that he was still 
unpersuaded by the majority opinion, but that he was bound by the decision in In re Mierkowski).  
The New York Court of Appeals decision also drew a harsh dissent.  Reiber, 913 N.E.2d at 391 
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courts that negative equity can form the basis for a purchase money security 
interest, the resolution of the issue is still, as the Eleventh Circuit put it, a 
―close call.‖10 
I disagree with the conclusion reached by the majority of the circuit courts, 
and I concur with the Ninth Circuit and the majority of bankruptcy courts that 
negative equity can form the basis of a purchase money security interest.
11
  
Negative equity is essentially antecedent debt that is not the type of obligation 
covered by the definition of purchase money security interest in the Uniform 
Commercial Code.  Unfortunately, given that so many circuit courts have held 
that negative equity is purchase money debt, the remaining circuits are unlikely 
to come to the opposite conclusion.
12
  Action from Congress is necessary to 
clarify what it meant when it wrote the term into the Bankruptcy Code. 
In Part II of this Comment, I will provide an explanation of the statutory 
background at issue in this debate, the significance of a purchase money 
security interest, and the interplay between state and federal law; in Part III, I 
will discuss the reasoning given by the circuit courts and analyze the merits of 
their various arguments; and in Part IV, I will explore some additional 
considerations in making the determination of whether negative equity 
financing can form the basis of a purchase money security interest. 
II.  STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND OTHER PRELIMINARY MATTERS 
A.  The Purchase Money “Super-Priority” 
For the purposes of this Comment, there are three types of creditors in a 
bankruptcy proceeding: unsecured creditors, secured creditors, and purchase 
money creditors.  Unsecured creditors lend money to the debtor based on 
nothing more than the debtor‘s promise to repay the money.  The creditor‘s 
return on his investment depends on the debtor‘s continued solvency.  
 
(Smith, J., dissenting). 
10. In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1301. 
11. Courts are also divided on the question of whether amounts financed for gap insurance and 
service contracts should be classified as a purchase money security interest.  Compare In re 
Spratling, 377 B.R. 941, 943 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (funds loaned for insurance and warranty can 
be a purchase money security interest); In re Macon, 376 B.R. 778, 781–83 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) 
(same); In re Murray, 352 B.R. 340, 347–49, 354 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006) (same), with In re 
Honcoop, 377 B.R. 719, 724 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007) (funds loaned for insurance cannot be a 
purchase money security interest); In re White, 352 B.R. 633, 648 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2006) (same).  
Interestingly, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Tenth Circuit concluded that, while negative 
equity is a purchase money security interest, funds advanced for gap insurance and a service contract 
are not.  Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Miller (In re Miller), No. KS-09-003, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3627, at 
*8, 13–14 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. Nov. 19, 2009).   
12. See In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 575 n.8 (―Our conclusion is bolstered by general prudential 
concerns with creating unnecessary circuit splits.‖).  But see In re Penrod, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14588, at *5–6 (―We acknowledge that our decision creates a circuit split, and we do not do this 
lightly.‖). 
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Unsecured creditors cannot turn to the debtor‘s assets or belongings to satisfy 
the debt obligation without going through a complex scheme of state 
procedures for obtaining a judgment, attaching a judgment lien, and executing 
on the judgment lien.  If the debtor goes bankrupt, the unsecured creditor 
receives a pro rata share of the debtor‘s estate along with the rest of the 
unsecured creditors. 
Secured creditors, on the other hand, can look to either the debtor or a 
piece of the debtor‘s property for payment.  The debtor typically grants the 
creditor a property interest, called a ―security interest,‖ in a piece of the 
debtor‘s property, the collateral.13  If the debtor stops making his payments on 
the debt, the creditor can simply foreclose on the collateral.
14
  If the creditor 
has leftover money after selling the collateral and satisfying the loan, he must 
return it to the debtor.  But if, as is often the case, the proceeds of the sale are 
not enough to satisfy the loan obligation, the debtor still owes to the creditor 
the remaining amount, called a ―deficiency.‖15  Obviously, it is in the secured 
creditor‘s best interest for the outstanding balance on the loan to be less than 
the market value of the property. 
Two or more creditors may take a security interest in the same piece of 
property.  Problems may arise, however, when the debtor defaults on the 
loans, and the piece of property must be seized and sold.  If the value of the 
property is less than the amount due on the loans, who gets paid first?  
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), which governs security 
interests, sets forth several rules for determining which creditor is ―first in 
line‖ to receive its payment.  In general, the U.C.C. follows the ―first in time, 
first in line‖ rule, which provides that the first creditor to perfect his security 
interest is the first in line to be paid from the proceeds of the collateral.
16
 
This rule makes it difficult for a debtor, typically a business, to buy a new 
piece of machinery or equipment on credit if any new assets are covered by an 
after-acquired property clause.
17
  Anyone lending money to a debtor to buy a 
new machine cannot take a first-position security interest in the machine 
because the blanket security interest was filed first.
18
  The new lender would 
 
13. 4 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 30-1, at 3–4, 
§ 30-2, at 14–15 (6th ed. 2010). 
14. Id. § 34-4, at 412. 
15. Id.  Depending on the type of property and the type of loan, the loan may be either recourse 
or nonrecourse.  Recourse loans allow the creditor to go back to the debtor to demand payment of the 
deficiency after the property is sold.  If the loan is nonrecourse, the creditor‘s seizure of the property 
satisfies the loan in full, regardless of the remaining amount due or the value of the collateral.  
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1020–21 (9th ed. 2009).  Nonrecourse loans, therefore, are riskier for 
the creditor because of the risk that collateral will depreciate in value. 
16. U.C.C. § 9-322 (2001); 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-3, at 323–26. 
17. U.C.C. § 9-204 (2001); 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-3, at 327. 
18. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-4, at 331. 
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have to get in line behind the blanket creditor before he could be paid in the 
event of a default. 
Enter the purchase money security interest (PMSI).  The PMSI functions 
as a ―super-priority‖ security interest by upsetting the normal first-in-time 
rule.
19
  Section 9-103 of the U.C.C. provides that a PMSI has priority over a 
prior security interest even though the PMSI creditor perfected its security 
interest later.
20
  A creditor with a PMSI has a first-in-line priority interest in 
the machinery over liens that were first in time.
21
  The concept of PMSI is 
based on equitable notions—―it protects vendors of goods from after-acquired 
property clauses generally used by banks and financiers.‖22 
In addition to exemption from the first-in-time rule, holders of PMSIs enjoy 
several other benefits.  First, a lender with a PMSI in consumer goods does not 
need to file a financing statement to perfect its lien.
23
  Second, debtors in 
bankruptcy can avoid nonpossessory, non-PMSIs in certain assets, but they 
cannot avoid nonpossessory PMSIs.
24
  Because of these powerful advantages, 
PMSIs should be narrowly construed to avoid unfair treatment to other creditors. 
B.  The “Hanging Paragraph” in Section 1325(a) 
Prior to 2005, the amount of a secured creditor‘s claim in a Chapter 13 
bankruptcy depended on the value of the creditor‘s collateral.  Section 506(a) 
of the Bankruptcy Code provides in pertinent part: 
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on 
property in which the estate has an interest . . . is a secured 
claim to the extent of the value of such creditor‘s interest in 
the estate‘s interest in such property . . . and is an unsecured 
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor‘s 
interest . . . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
25
 
This section is important for debtors that owe more on a loan than the 
 
19. See Keith G. Meyer, A Primer on Purchase Money Security Interests Under Revised 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 50 KAN. L. REV. 143, 149–50 (2001); see also Juliet M. 
Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the Proper Role of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 863, 
883 (2001) (―The purchase-money secured party has an exalted status under Article 9 of the 
U.C.C.‖). 
20. 4 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 13, § 33-4, at 330. 
21. See U.C.C. § 9-322. 
22. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 845 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2008). 
23. U.C.C. § 9-309(a) (2001). 
24. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2006).  In fact, the Federal Trade Commission considers the 
taking of a non-PMSI in certain household goods to be an unfair credit practice.  16 C.F.R. 
§ 444.2(a)(4) (2010). 
25. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2006). 
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collateral is worth.  Under this section, once a debtor files bankruptcy, the 
secured creditor‘s claim is split into two parts: a secured claim up to the value 
of the collateral, and an unsecured claim for the remaining portion.  This 
practice of separating, or ―bifurcating,‖ a creditor‘s lien into secured and 
unsecured portions is known as ―lien stripping‖ or ―cramdown‖ because the 
value of the creditor‘s lien is ―stripped‖ or ―crammed down‖ to the value of 
the collateral.  For example, if Lisa‘s Chapter 13 case was filed before 2005, 
Community America would have a secured claim up to the value of the 
Pontiac on the date of Lisa‘s filing, which Lisa asserted was $15,295.26  
Community America then would have an unsecured claim for the remaining 
balance of the loan. 
The secured status of a claim is particularly important in a Chapter 13 
case.  Section 1325(a)(5) provides that a Chapter 13 plan cannot be confirmed 
unless the secured creditor approves the plan, the debtor surrenders the 
property subject to the secured claim, or the plan provides for payment in full 
of the secured portion of the claim.  A creditor is not likely to approve a 
Chapter 13 plan that does not pay the entire amount of its claim, so the plan 
must pay the secured portion of the claim in full if a debtor wants to keep the 
encumbered property.  The unsecured portion of a crammed-down claim, 
however, need not be paid in full before the plan can be confirmed—the 
unsecured portion is paid pro rata with all of the other unsecured claims.
27
 
In 2005, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).
28
  BAPCPA dramatically 
altered the previous cramdown practice for automobiles by adding an 
unnumbered paragraph at the end of § 1325(a) (the ―hanging paragraph‖).29  
The hanging paragraph provides: 
For purposes of paragraph (5), section 506 shall not apply 
 
26. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007). 
27. This cramdown process essentially mimics the same result as if the creditor had foreclosed 
on the vehicle to satisfy the debt after the debtor defaulted, but the debtor gets to keep the property.  
In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 844 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).  The creditor receives full payment of the 
market value of the vehicle over the life of the Chapter 13 plan, and is left with an unsecured 
deficiency claim for the portion over and above the market value of the car.   
28. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).  The statute was enacted on April 20, 2005, and 
applies to bankruptcy cases commenced on or after October 17, 2005.  See id. at 23, 216. 
29. This paragraph has been referred to as ―§ 1325(a)(9),‖ ―§ 1325(a)(*),‖ the ―unnumbered 
paragraph,‖ and the ―hanging paragraph.‖  Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 
F.3d 1295, 1296 n.1 (11th Cir. 2008); see also, e.g., Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 
599 F.3d 498, 501 (6th Cir. 2010) (―The relevant provision appears as an unnumbered paragraph 
following § 1325(a), now commonly referred to as the ‗hanging paragraph‘ . . . .‖).  Much 
controversy has surrounded the meaning of this paragraph, but many of these issues are outside the 
scope of this Comment, which is only concerned with the effect of negative equity on the PMSI 
status of the claim. 
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to a claim described in that paragraph if the creditor has a 
purchase money security interest securing the debt that is the 
subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within the 910-day 
[sic] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the 
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . .
30
 
The effect of this paragraph is to exempt a creditor from the cramdown 
effects of § 506(a) when the requirements of the paragraph are satisfied.
31
  The 
claim must meet four requirements to be exempted from bifurcation under 
§ 506(a): (1) The debt must be secured by a PMSI; (2) the debt must have been 
incurred within 910 days of the date of the bankruptcy filing; (3) the collateral 
must consist of a motor vehicle; and (4) the collateral must be acquired for the 
personal use of the debtor.
32
  If the requirements are met, the hanging 
paragraph functions as an ―anti-cramdown‖ provision—because § 506(a) no 
longer applies, the debtor is prevented from bifurcating the creditor‘s claim 
into secured and unsecured portions, regardless of the collateral‘s value on the 
date of filing.
33
  The entire claim, including the portion over and above the 
value of the collateral, must be paid through the Chapter 13 plan.
34
  If the 
hanging paragraph applies in Lisa‘s case, Lisa‘s Chapter 13 plan would have to 
provide for payment of Community America‘s full claim of $28,251.24, 
regardless of the value of the car on the date of filing. 
 
30. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006).  In addition to the fact that the paragraph is not numbered like 
the rest of § 1325(a), there seems to be a missing noun after ―910-day.‖  Congress likely meant to say 
―910-day period.‖  The hanging paragraph also applies to ―any other thing of value‖ purchased 
within one year of filing.  Id.  This Comment is concerned only with the automobile provision, 
though the analysis would apply with the same force to any other asset where the loan included 
antecedent debt unrelated to the purchase price of the collateral. 
31. Section 506(a) is the only section in the Bankruptcy Code that gives secured creditors an 
allowed claim.  Presumably, Congress meant that the bifurcation of claims allowed by § 506(a) does 
not apply, not that the entire section does not apply.  See Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 
369 B.R. 36, 41 (D. Kan. 2007); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.06[1][a] (Alan N. Resnick & 
Henry J. Sommer eds., rev. 15th ed. 2008). 
32. The second, third, and fourth requirements are easily determined, although some litigation 
has resulted from the question of whether a vehicle was purchased for the personal use of the debtor.  
See, e.g., In re Matthews, 378 B.R. 481, 489 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2007) (discussing whether a vehicle was 
purchased for the debtor‘s personal use).  This Comment is concerned only with the question of 
whether the first requirement, purchase money status, is satisfied when negative equity is financed in 
addition to the purchase price. 
33. At least one commentator has argued that the hanging paragraph merely exempts the claim 
from § 506(a), and the court is free to apply any other method of valuation except the one prescribed in 
§ 506(a).  Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding on to Cars, Homes 
and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 457, 469–74 (2005).  Braucher 
argues that courts should apply the wholesale value to cars in bankruptcy because a lender foreclosing 
on the car would sell it at wholesale after repossession.  Id.  This Comment continues under the widely 
accepted view that by exempting the claim from application of § 506(a), bifurcation of the claim is not 
allowed and the creditor has a fully secured claim, regardless of the value of the collateral. 
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5). 
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C.  Defining Purchase Money Security Interest—State Law vs. Federal Law 
Unfortunately, the Bankruptcy Code does not define the term ―purchase 
money security interest.‖35  The phrase ―purchase money security interest‖ is 
a term of art, and it has no ―ordinary or generally understood‖ meaning in the 
context of the Bankruptcy Code.
36
  Purchase money status was intended to 
resolve conflicts over which creditor‘s claim would receive priority—and thus 
receive payment first—in the event of a default.37  The PMSI super-priority 
facilitates the harmony and coexistence of after-acquired property clauses that 
reduce risk in commercial loans and credit transactions for new equipment 
and machinery.  The Bankruptcy Code injected confusion by affording 
purchase money creditors additional benefits that are unrelated to the priority 
of conflicting security interests.  Indeed, the term is used only three times in 
the Code.
38
 
The bankruptcy provisions that place the most emphasis on purchase money 
status relate to consumer transactions,
39
 but the U.C.C. provides little guidance 
regarding PMSIs in the consumer context.
40
  Courts are left to grapple with the 
status of transactions for which PMSIs were never meant to have any relevance 
because conflicting priorities in consumer goods are a rarity. 
The Supreme Court long ago ruled that ―property rights in the assets of a 
bankrupt‘s estate‖ are a matter of state law.41  Security interests are essentially 
property interests, so the extent of a creditor‘s security interest is a question of 
state law.  But the question of whether negative equity might be part of a 
PMSI in a consumer vehicle does not arise outside of bankruptcy law, leaving 
a dearth of state law on the issue.
42
 
When the state law on a subject is unsettled, a federal court has four 
options: (1) It can abstain from deciding the issue and refer the parties to state 
 
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).  The term is used in only two other places in the Code, 
§ 522(f)(1)(B) and § 1110(d)(2). 
36. Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2009). 
37. See supra Part II.A. 
38. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)(B) (2006) (allowing a debtor to avoid a ―nonpossessory, 
nonpurchase-money security interest‖ if the debt encumbers an exempt asset); 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1110(d)(2) (2006) (allowing creditors to repossess certain types of aircraft in Chapter 11 
proceedings); 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (hanging paragraph). 
39. 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(f)(1)(B), 1325(a). 
40. Section 9-103 contains detailed rules for non-consumer goods transactions regarding 
payment allocation and mixed transactions that contain purchase money and non-purchase money 
components.  Section 9-103(h) explains that the U.C.C. is deliberately silent regarding certain rules 
for PMSIs in the consumer context. 
41. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979). 
42. Indeed, there is a dearth of state law on PMSIs in general.  I conducted a search of all state 
cases on LexisNexis for the term ―purchase money security interest,‖ and the search yielded only 783 
results.  The same search in all federal cases yielded 2,257 results. 
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court; (2) it can certify the question to the highest court of the state; (3) it can 
try to predict how the state court will decide the issue; or (4) it can make the 
decision for the state court.
43
  The first option cannot be used to solve the 
PMSI question because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy proceedings.
44
  The second option is not realistic because it would 
require certification to all fifty states before the law on the issue would be 
settled.
45
  The federal courts addressing the negative equity issue are therefore 
left attempting to apply the nearly nonexistent state law to find an answer to 
the question. 
The problem with turning to state law is that the U.C.C. drafters 
specifically cautioned against using section 9-103 to determine whether a 
creditor holds a PMSI in bankruptcy proceedings.  In Official Comment 8, the 
drafters explained their hesitance to include consumer goods in certain 
provisions of section 9-103: 
This section addresses only whether a security interest is 
a ―purchase-money security interest‖ under this Article, 
primarily for purposes of perfection and priority. . . .  
Whether a security interest is a ―purchase-money security 
interest‖ under other law is determined by that law. . . .  The 
Bankruptcy Code does not expressly adopt the state law 
definition of ―purchase-money security interest.‖  Where 
federal law does not defer to this Article, this Article does 
not, and could not, determine a question of federal law.
46
 
Indeed, the definition of ―purchase money security interest‖ has become a 
matter of federal interpretation.  The federal courts that purport to interpret the 
laws of different states rely on federal authority, rather than state law, for their 
opinions.
47
  Even the lone state court to address the issue relied solely on 
 
43. Jeffrey C. Alexander, Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the 
Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 157, 160–65 (1985). 
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006). 
45. See, e.g., Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 547 F.3d 177 (2d Cir. 2008).  The Second 
Circuit noted the absence of state law on the negative equity issue and certified the question to the 
New York Court of Appeals.  Id. at 186–87.  The length of time for a question to be certified and 
answered is also a relevant consideration.  Peaslee filed her Chapter 13 petition on July 11, 2006, the 
New York Court of Appeals did not answer the certified question until June 24, 2009, Reiber v. 
GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 2009), and the Second Circuit did not reverse 
the bankruptcy court decision until October 9, 2009, Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 
53 (2d Cir. 2009). 
46. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 8 (2001). 
47. Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 n.8 (5th Cir. 2009) (―Our 
conclusion is bolstered by general prudential concerns with creating unnecessary circuit splits.‖); 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (―This court strives to 
maintain uniformity in the law among the circuits, whenever reasoned analysis will allow.‖) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
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federal cases in reaching its conclusions.
48
  But only one case examining the 
negative equity issue has seriously considered whether a federal rule ought to 
be adopted.
49
  Instead, the courts purport to base their decisions on the state 
versions of U.C.C. section 9-103. 
Further illustrating the need for a federal rule is the fact that all fifty states 
have adopted the relevant provisions of the U.C.C.
50
  But the lack of state law 
on the meaning of PMSI has led different bankruptcy courts in the same 
district to render different interpretations of the same law.
51
  Congress can and 
should define ―purchase money security interest‖ in the Bankruptcy Code.  
Until it does, however, courts must look to state law—and only state law—to 
define the extent of a creditor‘s security interest because it is a property right. 
 
48. See In re Peaslee, 913 N.E.2d at 389–91. 
49. See In re Westfall, 376 B.R. 210, 212 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007).  Courts grappling with 
other issues raised by the hanging paragraph have advocated a national rule.  See AmeriCredit Fin. 
Servs. v. Long (In re Long), 519 F.3d 288, 291 (6th Cir. 2008) (suggesting a national rule regarding 
the consequences of surrendering a vehicle covered by the hanging paragraph). 
50. All fifty states (and the District of Columbia) have adopted § 9-103 of the U.C.C., which 
defines the term ―purchase money security interest.‖  ALA. CODE § 7-9A-103 (LexisNexis 2006); 
ALASKA STAT. § 45.29.103 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-9103 (2005); ARK. CODE. ANN. 
§ 4-9-103 (2001); CAL. COM. CODE § 9103 (West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-103 (2009); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-103a (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 9-103 (2005); D.C. 
CODE § 28:9-103 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1031 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 11-9-103 
(2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:9-103 (LexisNexis 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-103 
(2001); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-103 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-103 
(LexisNexis 2005); IOWA CODE ANN. § 554.9103 (West 2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103 (Supp. 
2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.9-103 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-103 
(2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-1103 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW. § 9-103 
(LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 9-103 (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 440.9103 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.9-103 (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN.  
§ 75-9-103 (2002); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-103 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-9A-103 
(2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-103 (2001); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 104.9103 (LexisNexis 2007); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:9-103 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-103 (West 2004); 
N.M. STAT. § 55-9-103 (2001); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 9-103 (Consol. Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
§ 25-9-103 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-03 (Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.103 
(LexisNexis 2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-9-103 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.0103 
(2007); 13 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9103 (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-103 (2001); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-103 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 47-9-103 (2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.103 (Vernon 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 70A-9a-103 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-103 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-103 (2001); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9A-103 (West 2003); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-103 (LexisNexis 
2007); WIS. STAT. § 409.103 (2007–2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-103 (2009). 
A few states have adopted a slightly modified version, but the definition of purchase money 
security interest remains the same.  See infra note 190. 
51. Compare In re Ford, 387 B.R. 827, 833 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (negative equity included in 
PMSI), and In re Dunlap, 383 B.R. 113, 119 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008) (same), with In re Padgett, 389 
B.R. 203, 213 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2008) (negative equity not included in PMSI), and In re Crawford, 
397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008) (same). 
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III.  FINDING A MEANING FOR ―PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST‖ 
The ―plethora of cases‖52 addressing the negative equity issue that have 
been decided since the BAPCPA was enacted are split into two categories.  
The first group of courts—the Ninth Circuit and the early majority of 
bankruptcy courts—holds that the negative equity portion of an auto loan 
cannot form the basis of a purchase money security interest.
53
  The second 
group, which includes eight of the circuit decisions to date, holds that the 
negative equity portion of the loan does not alter the purchase money nature 
of the security interest, and that the entire claim is subject to the anti-
cramdown provisions of the hanging paragraph.  The arguments advanced on 
each side of the issue are invariable from one case to the next.
54
  This Part 
provides an overview and analysis of the arguments that the circuit courts 
have relied on to determine that a PMSI can include negative equity, 
ultimately concluding that the reasoning of the circuit courts is flawed and the 
better holding is that negative equity cannot be included in a PMSI. 
A.  Official Comment 3 and the (Non)Exhaustive List of Expenses 
Because the term ―purchase money security interest‖ is not defined in the 
Bankruptcy Code, courts look to state law for the definition.
55
  Every state has 
adopted section 9-103 of the U.C.C. without substantial revision.
56
  Thus, 
each of the courts to address the issue is essentially examining the same law. 
 
52. In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 618 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2008).  In fact, the issue has generated 
nearly ninety opinions from bankruptcy courts, district courts, and circuit courts.  See, e.g., infra note 53. 
53. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 
14588 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010); Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott), 396 B.R. 506, 510 
(E.D. Mo. 2008); Bank of America v. Look, No. 08-129-P-H, 2008 WL 2789477 (D. Me. July 17, 
2008); Citifinancial Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 48 (D. Kan. 2007); In re McCauley, 
398 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 467 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); 
In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 452 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008); In re Brodowski, 391 B.R. 393, 403–04 
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008); In re Mancini, 390 B.R. 796, 805 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2008); In re Hernandez, 
388 B.R. 883, 885 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2008); In re Munzberg, 388 B.R. 529, 548 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2008); 
In re Look, 383 B.R. 210, 219 (Bankr. D. Me. 2008); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or. 
2007); In re Lavigne, No. 07-30192, 2007 WL 3469454, at *8 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 14, 2007); In re 
Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 142 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Conyers, 379 B.R. 576, 582 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 2007); In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655, 672–73 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Sanders, 377 
B.R. 836, 864 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007); In re Blakeslee, 377 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); 
In re Kellerman, 377 B.R. 302, 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 154 (Bankr. 
E.D. Va. 2007); In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 
741 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 623 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). 
54. For example, Professor Ingrid Hillinger from Boston College Law School indicated that she 
had filed the same amicus brief in three circuit cases.  Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Meaning of 
―Purchase Money Security Interest‖ Under Section 1325(a)(9)(*) (a.k.a. the Hanging Paragraph) 
(2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
55. See supra Part II.C. 
56. See supra note 50.  The only real deviation that some states have made is to eliminate the 
consumer/non-consumer distinction in section 9-103.  See infra note 190. 
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Article 9 of the U.C.C. was revised in 2001.  Prior to the revision, the 
definition of ―purchase money security interest‖ had two prongs: (1) an 
interest ―taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of 
its price,‖ and (2) an interest taken by a third party who ―gives value to enable 
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such value is in fact so 
used.‖57  The first prong protected sellers who financed the sale themselves, 
and the second prong protected third-party financiers, e.g., banks and other 
lenders.  Creditors asserting a PMSI could prevail if they satisfied either 
prong. 
Revised Article 9 defines ―purchase-money security interest‖ via a more 
circuitous route.
58
  Section 9-103(b) provides that ―[a] security interest in 
goods is a purchase-money security interest . . . to the extent that the goods 
are purchase-money collateral with respect to that security interest.‖  
―Purchase-money collateral‖ is defined as ―goods or software that secures a 
purchase-money obligation incurred with respect to that collateral.‖59  
―Purchase-money obligation‖ is defined as ―an obligation of an obligor 
incurred as all or part of the price of the collateral or for value given to enable 
the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of the collateral if the value is in fact 
so used.‖60  Revised Article 9 simply eliminates the distinction between the 
seller and the third-party lender, allowing either to take a PMSI for the price 
of the collateral or the value given to enable the debtor to acquire the 
collateral.
61
 
The text of the U.C.C. provides little guidance to determine whether 
something is part of the ―price of the collateral‖ or the ―value given to enable 
the debtor to acquire rights in the collateral‖ such that it becomes part of the 
PMSI.  Comment 3 to section 9-103 provides more insight.  Comment 3 
provides that 
the ―price‖ of collateral or the ―value given to enable‖ 
includes obligations for expenses incurred in connection with 
acquiring rights in the collateral, sales taxes, duties, finance 
 
57. U.C.C. § 9-107 (1972). 
58. U.C.C. § 9-103 (2001). 
59. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(1). 
60. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2). 
61. See U.C.C. § 9-103.  A few debtors have tried to argue that Revised Article 9 retains the 
distinction, and that because the PMSI was originally taken by the dealer (who is the seller), the 
lender has a PMSI for only the price of the collateral.  See, e.g., Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re 
Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 573–74 (5th Cir. 2009).  The argument has not been successful.  See id. at 574 
(―[T]he creditor prevails if the debt at issue satisfies either prong.‖); see also Ford v. Ford Motor 
Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1284 n.3 (10th Cir. 2009) (asserting that the terms ―price‖ 
and ―value given to enable‖ are equivalent).  But see AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Penrod,  
No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *15 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010) (holding that the 
―price‖ prong applies only to sellers and the ―value given‖ prong applies to third-party financiers). 
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charges, interest, freight charges, costs of storage in transit, 
demurrage, administrative charges, expenses of collection and 
enforcement, attorney‘s fees, and other similar obligations.62 
Comment 3 goes on to provide that ―[t]he concept of ‗purchase-money 
security interest‘ requires a close nexus between the acquisition of collateral 
and the secured obligation.‖63  The circuit courts have generally found that 
negative equity is included in the price of the collateral, it is value given to 
enable the debtor to acquire the collateral, and it bears a ―close nexus‖ to the 
financing transaction.  As I explain below, negative equity does not pass any 
of these tests. 
1.  Price of the Collateral 
There is no question that Comment 3 to the U.C.C. does not include 
negative equity in the list of things that can be included in the price of the 
collateral or the value given to enable purchase of the collateral.
64
  Whether 
negative equity fits in the laundry list of examples given in the comment is a 
matter of how a court views the connection between the examples listed in 
Comment 3. 
a.  Ejusdem Generis 
Almost without fail, debtors have attempted to invoke the canon of 
statutory construction known as ejusdem generis.  The doctrine of ejusdem 
generis provides that ―[w]here general words follow specific words in a 
statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only 
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific 
words.‖65  Therefore, the phrase ―other similar obligations‖ at the end of the 
list must be construed to include only obligations that are similar to the 
obligations specifically enumerated in Comment 3.  Debtors argue that the 
enumerated obligations are best categorized as ―transaction costs.‖  Negative 
equity is not analogous to the rest of the items because it is not a typical cost 
of completing the transaction, such as sales taxes, finance charges, and 
administrative expenses. 
The circuit courts have flatly rejected the debtors‘ arguments, but for 
differing reasons.  The Fifth Circuit rejected a debtor‘s attempt to invoke the 
canon, finding that ―the listed expenses in Comment 3 have no common 
 
62. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (emphasis added).  Roughly half of the states specifically included 
the comments in their official state version of the U.C.C. statutes.  Most annotated versions of the 
state statutes published by West or Lexis include the U.C.C. comments.  See supra note 50. 
63. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
64. See id. 
65. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 47:17, at 358–60 (7th ed. 2007). 
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feature beyond an attenuated connection to the acquisition or maintenance of 
the vehicle.‖66  It held that negative equity has the same ―attenuated 
connection‖ to the acquisition of the vehicle.  Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit 
found that the list in Comment 3 is not ―exhaustive,‖ and that it constitutes 
―merely examples‖ of additional components of the price of the collateral.67  
The court cited the inclusion of attorney‘s fees in the list as evidence that the 
term ―price‖ should be construed broadly.  The inclusion of attorney‘s fees 
―belies the notion that price or value is narrowly viewed as only those 
[traditional] expenses that must be paid to drive the car off the lot.‖68 
The Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, found that the items listed in 
Comment 3 do have a common connection as ―transaction costs‖ for the 
purchase of the collateral.
69
  Like taxes, duties, interest, and freight charges, 
negative equity, the Fourth Circuit concluded, is simply a cost associated with 
the transaction, and therefore negative equity falls within the definition 
provided in Comment 3.
70
 
The Tenth Circuit also found a connection between the items in 
Comment 3.  It held that the enumerated expenses are incurred so that the 
creditor may realize the value of its security interest.
71
  While the Tenth 
Circuit‘s characterization of the connection between the items in Comment 3 
is probably the best of the opinions to date, the court improperly characterized 
negative equity as being among the expenses incurred so that the creditor can 
realize the value of its security interest. 
The court held that ―[t]he discharge of negative equity clears the title of 
the trade-in vehicle, permitting the creditor to realize the value of the vehicle 
it receives as part of the trade.‖72  There are a couple of problems with this 
statement.  First, the statement assumes that the creditor is the one that 
receives the trade-in.  It is true that the dealership may in some instances 
finance the transaction, but the loan is more often than not immediately sold 
to a bank or other financial institution.
73
  So the fact that the negative equity 
 
66. In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 574. 
67. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008). 
68. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
69. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009). 
70. Id.  Interestingly, the Tenth Circuit recognized the strength of the debtor‘s argument that all 
of the specific items in Comment 3 are transaction costs, but it refused to limit the breadth of the 
phrase ―other similar obligations‖ to transaction costs because the term ―transaction costs‖ was not 
used.  Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2009) (―Had the 
drafters of the U.C.C. intended to limit a purchase-money security interest to cash price plus 
transaction costs, they could easily have done so.‖). 
71. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285. 
72. Id. 
73. Indeed, none of the cases that made their way to the circuit level were pursued by 
dealerships themselves.  Rather, they were pursued by lending institutions, though many of the 
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allows the dealer to realize the full value of the trade-in vehicle is in no way 
related to the security interest that the bank takes in the new vehicle.  The 
trade-in allows the dealership, not the secured creditor, to realize the full value 
of the trade-in.  The secured creditor has no interest in the trade-in and does 
not care what value the dealership receives from a trade-in that is not the 
creditor‘s collateral. 
Second, in the cases involving negative equity, the security interest is in 
the new vehicle.  Financing negative equity from the trade-in does not allow 
the creditor to realize the value of its security interest in the new vehicle.  
Negative equity is for the benefit of the dealer (with regard to the old vehicle 
only) and for the benefit of the debtor (so that she may buy a new car without 
having to pay completely pay off the old one first).   
As Judge Tymkovich noted in his dissent from the Tenth Circuit‘s 
opinion, each expense in the list ―adds no particular value for either the buyer 
or the seller but is instead simply the cost of using the price mechanism.‖74  
Things like sales taxes, duties, freight charges, costs of storage in transit, 
demurrage, and administrative charges must be paid so the collateral can be 
delivered to the buyer.  The other items in the list are expenses charged by the 
secured creditor itself.  Finance charges, interest, expenses of collection and 
enforcement, and attorney‘s fees are costs that allow the secured creditor to 
realize the value of his security interest because they make it worth the 
creditor‘s while to actually lend money to the debtor.  Negative equity, on the 
other hand, is ―a transfer of money for value.‖75  The creditor provides money 
to pay off the balance on the preexisting loan, and the debtor promises to pay 
the money back, with interest, and grants the creditor a security interest in the 
collateral.   
The financing of negative equity is ―completely unrelated to the price of 
the [collateral] and its financing or the costs associated with transfer of 
title.‖76  The Ninth Circuit adopted this view in holding that the items in 
Comment 3 are transaction costs related to the actual purchase of the vehicle, 
while negative equity is separable from the purchase transaction.
77
  Thus, it 
cannot be akin to the itemized costs in Comment 3. 
b.  In Pari Materia 
Many of the courts to address the negative equity issue have found that the 
 
institutions are solely in the business of motor vehicle loans.   
74. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1289 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14588, at *11 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010). 
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term ―price‖ as it is used in the U.C.C. is ambiguous because ―the extent or 
reach of the term is uncertain.‖78  They then turn to a canon of statutory 
interpretation, known as in pari materia, which allows them to construe the 
U.C.C. provisions in accordance with price as it is defined in other statutes.
79
  
Statutes are read in pari materia when they relate to the same person, class of 
persons, or subject.
80
 
The courts using in pari materia to find the meaning of price have looked 
to state retail installment sales act (RISA) statutes and the federal Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA).
81
  For example, in Reiber v. GMAC, the New York 
Court of Appeals turned to the New York Motor Vehicle Retail Installment 
Sales Act (MVRISA), which includes in ―cash sale price‖ the ―‗unpaid 
balance of any amount financed under an outstanding motor vehicle loan 
agreement or motor vehicle retail installment contract.‘‖82  The court reasoned 
that cash sale price includes negative equity under the MVRISA, so the 
negative equity could be part of the price of the collateral under the U.C.C.
83
  
Similarly, in In re Graupner, the bankruptcy court turned to the definition of 
―cash sale price‖ in the Georgia Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act.  The court 
held that ―the Georgia General Assembly intended . . . to permit negative 
equity in a trade-in vehicle to be added to the cash sales price of a new vehicle 
without precluding the financing creditor or its assignee from taking a 
purchase money security interest in the new vehicle.‖84 
The courts also find support for their position in TILA.
85
  TILA directs the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to promulgate regulations for 
disclosure of credit terms to consumers.
86
  The regulations under TILA 
provide that the ―total sale price‖ includes the sum of the cash price and any 
other amounts financed by the creditor.
87
  The courts conclude that because 
negative equity is an amount financed by the creditor, it is included in cash 
sale price under TILA.
88
  When reading TILA together with the U.C.C., they 
 
78. See In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 919 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006). 
79. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:1, at 196. 
80. Id. § 51:3, at 235–37. 
81. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2006). 
82. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 2009) (quoting N.Y. 
PERS. PROP. LAW § 301(6) (Consol. Supp. 2009)). 
83. Id. 
84. In re Graupner, 356 B.R. 907, 923 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2006), aff’d, Graupner v. Nuvell 
Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1289 (11th Cir. 2008). 
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1601. 
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2006). 
87. 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(j) (2010). 
88. See, e.g., GMAC v. Horne, 390 B.R. 191, 202–03 (E.D. Va. 2008). 
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conclude that negative equity is also part of the price of the vehicle under the 
U.C.C.
89
 
The problem with reading these statutes together is that the MVRISA and 
TILA do not define ―purchase money security interest,‖ which is the term at 
issue.  Instead, the courts look to these other statutes for guidance on the term 
―price‖ as used in the U.C.C.  In fact, the statutes that the courts look to do not 
even define the term ―price.‖  The New York Court of Appeals noted that 
―New York has defined ‗price‘ in its Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales 
Act . . . to include negative equity.‖90  But the New York legislature defined 
―cash sale price‖—as most state RISA statutes do—it did not define ―price.‖91   
The Eighth Circuit‘s reason for reading Missouri‘s Motor Vehicle Time 
Sales Act (MVTSA) in conjunction with Missouri‘s U.C.C. is even more 
questionable.  First, the court found that ―Article 9 and MVTSA both relate to 
the installment financing of motor vehicles, and should be read in pari 
materia.‖92  Yet the Missouri U.C.C. contains no rules regarding installment 
sales or motor vehicles.  The court went on to compare the term ―price‖ in the 
U.C.C. with the terms ―cash sale price‖ and ―time sale price‖ in the MVTSA.  
It held that because the Missouri legislature had defined ―cash sale price‖ to 
mean literally that—the price at which the vehicle would have been sold for 
cash—and the legislature defined ―time sale price‖ to include ―other benefits,‖ 
the legislature must have meant to equate price in the U.C.C. with time sale 
price in the MVTSA.
93
   
The TILA regulations do not use the term ―price‖ either.  Instead, they use 
the terms ―amount financed‖ and ―total sale price.‖94  Indeed, TILA does not 
even apply to business transactions.
95
  U.C.C. section 9-103 applies to all 
transactions, and the courts using in pari materia to compare TILA and the 
U.C.C. are defining the term ―price‖ in a statute that applies to businesses and 
 
89. Id. 
90. Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 390 (N.Y. 2009). 
91. N.Y. PERS. PROP. § 301(6) (Consol. Supp. 2009). 
92. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009). 
93. Id. 
94. 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18(b), 226.18(j) (2010).  Comparing ―price‖ in the TILA regulations to 
―price‖ in the U.C.C. is further complicated by the fact that one is a federal law and the other is a 
state law.  In dissenting from the Tenth Circuit‘s opinion, Judge Tymkovich noted that ―the manner 
in which a federal agency has interpreted the term ‗price‘ in a federal statute sheds little light on what 
[a state] legislature meant when it employed the term in its version of the U.C.C.‖  Ford v. Ford 
Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1292 (10th Cir. 2009). 
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (2006).  Justice Smith of the New York Court of Appeals expressed 
his concern that the majority‘s interpretation of PMSI to include negative equity would have a 
detrimental impact on the priority scheme set out by the New York U.C.C.  In re Peaslee, 913 
N.E.2d at 393 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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consumers alike using another statute that applies only to consumers.
96
 
Even if the U.C.C., TILA, and state RISA statutes all used the exact same 
term, the U.C.C. has a very different purpose than the TILA and RISA 
statutes.  Statutes should be read in pari materia only ―when they relate to the 
same person or thing, to the same class of persons or things, or have the same 
purpose or object.‖97  Whether the statutes have the same purpose or object is 
more important than whether they relate to the same class of persons in 
determining if they are so closely related that they should be read together.
98
  
If the same class of persons is affected by statutes having different purposes, 
the statutes should not be read in pari materia.
99
  The Ninth Circuit employed 
this rule when it held that it could not read the California Automobile Sales 
Finance Act (ASFA) together with the U.C.C. because ―[t]he disclosure 
provisions of the ASFA were enacted for a different purpose than the ‗price of 
the collateral‘ provision in the U.C.C.‖100 
The purpose of Article 9 of the U.C.C. is to provide rules governing the 
creation and enforcement of security interests.
101
  In contrast, the purpose of 
TILA is to provide consumers with ―a meaningful disclosure of credit 
terms . . . [to prevent] the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the 
consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing . . . practices.‖102  
Similarly, the purpose of RISA statutes is to allow consumers to make 
informed decisions about credit through extensive disclosure.
103
  The goal of 
 
96. Admittedly, the U.C.C. provides that transactions governed by Article 9 may be subject to 
―any applicable rule of law which establishes a different rule for consumers.‖  U.C.C. § 9-201(b) 
(2001).  But something as fundamental as the price of a piece of collateral should not be subject to 
different rules for consumers and for businesses.  Courts that read the U.C.C. in pari materia with 
consumer statutes would then allow negative equity to form the basis of a PMSI when a consumer 
purchases a motor vehicle but not when a business purchases a motor vehicle. 
97. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:3, at 235–37. 
98. Id. § 51:3, at 240–41.  The definition of in pari materia in Black‘s Law Dictionary only 
includes subject matter.  The dictionary defines ―in pari materia‖ as ―[o]n the same subject; relating 
to the same matter.  It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be 
construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another 
statute on the same subject.‖  BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 862 (9th ed. 2009). 
99. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:3, at 247; see also Nashville, Chattanooga & 
St. Louis Ry. v. Ry. Employees‘ Dep‘t of Am. Fed‘n of Labor, 93 F.2d 340, 343 (6th Cir. 1937) 
(―[W]e know of no rule of statutory construction which requires two acts relating to separate and 
distinct subjects to be read in pari materia, even though they affect the same general class of 
persons.‖) (emphasis added).  For example, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act 
are not to be read in pari materia.  United States v. Papercraft Corp., 540 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 1976). 
100. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14588, at *12 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010). 
101. See U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2001). 
102. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006); see also In re Loos, 189 B.R. 495, 497 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1995) 
(―The purpose of TILA is to promote the informed use of credit by consumers.‖). 
103. See, e.g., 69 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 602(d) (West 2004) (―[I]t is hereby declared to be 
the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . to [ensure] honest and efficient consumer credit 
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both TILA and RISA statutes is to protect consumers, whereas the goal of 
Article 9 of the U.C.C. is to protect the rights of creditors.
104
  Moreover, even 
assuming that the U.C.C. relates to the same subject as TILA and RISA 
statutes, the in pari materia doctrine allows an inference that the legislature‘s 
failure to include negative equity in the U.C.C. definition of ―price‖ when it 
was already included in ―cash sale price‖ in the RISA statute was 
deliberate.
105
  Comparing the U.C.C. to TILA and RISA statutes is like 
comparing the rules regarding how to make a baseball with the rules regarding 
how to play the game of baseball.  While the two may use the same term, they 
cover two very different subjects. 
2.  Value Given to Enable 
The circuit courts further suggest that the financing of negative equity is 
―value given to enable‖ the debtor to acquire rights in the new car.106  Without 
paying off the negative equity on the trade-in, the debtor would not have been 
able to purchase the car.  The Fourth Circuit looked to the dictionary 
definition of the term ―enable,‖ finding that it means ―to make possible.‖107  
The court concluded that the negative equity enabled the purchase of the new 
vehicle because it was integral to the whole transaction.
108
  Car dealers are 
unwilling to accept a trade-in with a lien still attached, so the negative equity 
on the trade-in must be extinguished for the transaction on the new car to 
move forward.
109
  The court found that the negative equity enabled the 
transaction because ―it allow[ed] the purchaser to utilize the value of the 
trade-in.‖110 
 
service for installment purchasers of motor vehicles . . . .‖). 
104. Only one circuit that discussed the in pari materia argument has rejected it.  The Seventh 
Circuit held that the Illinois RISA is ―a consumer-protection statute, intended to require disclosure of 
the charges that make up the total price that a consumer pays for the car, rather than to prescribe what 
is and is not included in the purchase money security interest.‖  Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. 
(In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2010). 
105. 2B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 65, § 51:2, at 225–28. 
106. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010); In re 
Howard, 597 F.3d at 857–58; Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Dale v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Dale), 582 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2009); Wells Fargo Fin. 
Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 625 (4th Cir. 2009). 
The Ninth Circuit refused to consider this prong of the definition of PMSI, finding that the ―value 
given to enable‖ prong applied only when the transaction was financed by a third-party lender at the 
outset.  The dealership (which was the seller of the collateral) had initially financed the automobile and 
sold the loan to AmeriCredit.  AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 
2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *15–16 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010). 
107. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
108. Id. 
109. Id.  Indeed, in some states it is a felony for a car dealer to accept a trade-in without paying 
off the outstanding loan.  See, e.g., In re Dale, 582 F.3d at 571 n.3 (citing Texas statute). 
110. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627. 
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Furthermore, courts have found that it would be logistically impossible for 
the debtor to complete the purchase of the new car without trading in the old 
one.  For example, the In re Weiser court placed much emphasis on Lisa‘s 
testimony that she would not have qualified for a loan to buy the Pontiac 
unless she traded in, and paid off the loan on, the RAV4.
111
 
The circuit courts have rejected debtors‘ arguments that the financing of 
negative equity enabled the transaction, rather than enabled the debtor to 
acquire rights in the vehicle.  In In re Price, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that 
―[i]f negative equity financing enabled the transaction in which the new car 
was acquired, then, in reality, the negative equity financing also enabled the 
acquisition of rights in the new car.‖112  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in In re 
Westfall found that ―[t]he portion attributable to negative equity played an 
integral role in the overall transaction.‖113  The negative equity financing 
enabled the debtors to acquire rights in the new car because the ―[d]ebtors 
incurred the entire obligation at the same time for the singular purpose of 
acquiring the new vehicle.‖114 
The circuit courts are reading the U.C.C. much too broadly.  While it is 
true that paying off the loan on the debtor‘s trade-in car does enable her to 
buy the new car by freeing up some cash, it does not enable the debtor to buy 
the new car in the same way that the money for the sticker price of the new 
car does.  The circuit courts reason that the debtor needs to pay off the old car 
in order to trade it in for the new car, and to do so she needs to pay off the 
negative equity on the old car.
115
  While Lisa was financially unable to afford 
two cars at the same time, she was not required to trade in the RAV4 in order 
to acquire rights in the Pontiac.
116
  The money the new creditor gives the 
debtor to pay off the old creditor ―is value that enables the debtor to pay off 
his or her existing car lender.  It is not value that enables the debtor to buy the 
new car.‖117  The value given for the negative equity enables the car dealer to 
take the trade-in, it does not enable the car dealer to make the sale. 
Further, the courts have needlessly confused enabling the transaction with 
enabling the debtor to acquire rights in the vehicle.  According to the Fourth 
 
111. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 268 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007). 
112. Price, 562 F.3d at 625. 
113. Nuvell Credit Corp. v. Westfall (In re Westfall), 599 F.3d 498, 505 (6th Cir. 2010). 
114. Id. 
115. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. at 267–68; see also In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627 (―[T]ransactions 
involving items other than automobiles would present very different circumstances from the ones 
before us here.‖). 
116. See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1289 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting).  Judge Tymkovich noted that decisions to finance the negative equity on 
a trade-in depend on the individual circumstances of each debtor.  Id. 
117. Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Debtors Position Seeking Affirmance in Part at 13, 
In re Price, 562 F.3d 618 (No. 07-2185), 2008 WL 2307405 (emphasis added). 
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and Tenth Circuits, ―‗[f]rom a practical perspective, that distinction is 
meaningless.‘‖118  But the distinction is incredibly meaningful, because the 
U.C.C. allows a PMSI only for ―value given to enable the debtor to acquire 
rights in or the use of the collateral.‖119  The U.C.C. does provide that a debtor 
incurs a purchase money obligation for all expenses that enable the debtor to 
complete the transaction with the creditor.  Courts should be focused on only 
the expenses that allow the debtor to acquire rights in the new vehicle.  
Financing negative equity does not allow the debtor to acquire rights in the 
new vehicle.  Negative equity is a value given to the debtor to allow her to 
trade in her old vehicle before she purchases a new one.  The new creditor 
must finance the negative equity only in the sense that someone needs to pay 
the dealer the negative equity balance so that the dealer can pay the loan on 
the old vehicle, otherwise the dealer could not take the trade-in. 
3.  Close Nexus 
Comment 3 to section 9-103 of the U.C.C. is also clear that a ―close 
nexus‖ must exist between the ―acquisition of collateral and the secured 
obligation.‖120  The circuit courts have invariably held that the new lender‘s 
financing of the negative equity has a sufficiently close nexus with the 
acquisition of the collateral.
121
  They reason that the close nexus requirement 
is satisfied because all components of the new loan are part of a single 
transaction memorialized on a single document.
122
  The financing of the 
negative equity would not take place without the purchase of the new car, so 
the deal is, in essence, a ―‗package deal.‘‖123  The Tenth Circuit found that the 
trade-in transaction is essentially a ―swap,‖ and that the additional financing 
of negative equity ―should not turn the swap into two separate 
transactions.‖124  According to the Fourth Circuit, the trade-in is a single 
transaction, and negative equity is simply an expense incurred in the 
transaction.
125
 
This approach favors the form over the substance of the transaction.  The 
debtor did not simply trade one car for another and in the process incur more 
debt.  The new car dealer purchased the old car from the debtor and the debtor 
 
118. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505 (quoting In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625). 
119. U.C.C. § 9-103(a)(2) (2001). 
120. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3. 
121. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 
580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627; 
Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 2008). 
122. In re Westfall, 599 F.3d at 505; In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1284–85. 
123. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 743 (8th Cir. 
2009) (quoting In re Graupner, 537 F.3d at 1302); In re Price, 562 F.3d at 625 (same). 
124. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285. 
125. In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627. 
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purchased a new car from the dealer, resulting in two separate transactions.  It 
should not matter that the transactions were memorialized in a single contract.  
In contrast to the other circuits, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the creditor‘s 
―package deal‖ argument, holding that a PMSI does not arise simply because 
two types of debt are memorialized on a single document.
126
 
When the dealer purchased the old car from the debtor, it paid the debtor a 
certain purchase price.  In Lisa‘s case, Van Chevrolet paid $21,000 for Lisa‘s 
Toyota.  It is true that Lisa still owed Toyota Motor Finance $9,031.64 after 
the purchase, but Lisa could have paid this remaining balance in any number 
of ways.  For instance, she could have paid cash or she could have paid the 
balance using her credit card.  Instead, she chose to finance that amount with 
Van Chevrolet at the same time she purchased a new car.  That choice does 
not transform what are essentially two transactions into a single transaction, 
regardless of whether they are memorialized in a single document. 
The majority of the circuit courts seem to disregard the fact that the rolling 
of negative equity into the new loan is essentially a refinance.
127
  The 2001 
revision to the U.C.C. clarified that a PMSI that is refinanced retains its 
character as a PMSI for non-consumer goods transactions.
128
  Subsection (h) 
leaves it to the courts to determine whether to apply the same rule for 
consumer goods.
129
  The comments are clear, however, that if additional funds 
beyond the original purchase price are loaned in the refinance transaction, the 
new loan is a PMSI only to the extent of the amount of the original purchase 
price that was refinanced.
130
 
Moreover, negative equity is essentially antecedent debt.
131
  Case law 
construing PMSI in light of § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that 
any antecedent debt financed in a purchase money transaction cannot form the 
basis of a PMSI.
132
  The debtor incurred the obligation to pay before the 
 
126. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14588, at *10 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010). 
127. In re Penrod, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 14588, at *9 (―[Negative equity] is the payment of 
an antecedent debt, not an expense incurred in buying the new vehicle.‖); see also Reiber v. GMAC, 
LLC (In re Peaslee), 913 N.E.2d 387, 391 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting) (―A refinanced loan is 
not, in accounting terms, properly speaking, an ‗expense‘ at all; it is the substitution of a new liability 
for an old one.‖). 
128. U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(3) (2001). 
129. Id. § 9-103(h).  Eight states have chosen to eliminate the consumer/non-consumer goods 
distinction, see infra note 190, so a refinance would not destroy the PMSI for a consumer goods 
transaction. 
130. U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 7a.  The comment indicates that if the remaining $10,000 on a PMSI 
loan were refinanced along with an additional $2,000, the $2,000 would not be a PMSI.  Id. 
131. Black‘s Law Dictionary defines ―antecedent‖ as ―preexisting.‖  BLACK‘S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 98, at 107. 
132. See, e.g., Matthews v. Transamerica Fin. Servs. (In re Matthews), 724 F.2d 798, 800–01 
(9th Cir. 1984); see also U.C.C. § 9-107 cmt. 2 (1972). 
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transaction to purchase the new car was entered into, so the negative equity is 
a preexisting debt.  The Eastern District of Michigan concluded in In re 
Muldrew that the negative equity was part of the ―bargained-for total cash 
price of the new vehicle.‖133  This conclusion mischaracterizes the negative 
equity.  Even if the price of the new car was higher or lower due to the 
inclusion of negative equity, the fact is not changed that the debtor had an 
obligation to pay the negative equity amount before she ever walked into the 
car dealership.  That obligation is not sufficiently related to the new car 
purchase to satisfy the close nexus requirement. 
Further, the vehicle does not secure money required to make the purchase.  
Judge Bye of the Eighth Circuit noted that when a debtor takes out a general 
loan and pledges his vehicle as security, the creditor has a security interest in 
the vehicle, just not a PMSI.
134
  ―The close association which financing 
negative equity has to many vehicle sales transactions is not enough to satisfy 
the close nexus test, because negative equity is not causally related to the 
price of the new vehicle.‖135  Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that while the 
financing of negative equity was in fact connected to the purchase of the 
vehicle, it was not ―sufficiently connected‖ to allow a PMSI.136 
The circuit courts also place emphasis on the fact that the debtor is trading 
in an old car for a new car.
137
  Some even acknowledge that had the debtor 
asked for funds to pay off her credit cards or go on a vacation, that portion of 
the loan on the new car would not be purchase money.
138
  But it should not 
matter that the debtor traded in one type of good for a new one of the same 
type.  What would happen if the debtor traded in a motorcycle?  Or an RV?  
Or a golf cart?  Or a bicycle?  Those are all vehicles that could serve as the 
debtor‘s primary mode of transportation, but the circuit courts would surely 
agree that any negative equity in those items that was financed by the new car 
lender would not be a PMSI.
139
 
 
133. Nuvell Credit Co. v. Muldrew (In re Muldrew), 396 B.R. 915, 926 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
134. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 744 (8th Cir. 
2009) (Bye, J., dissenting).   
135. Id. at 747. 
136. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 14588, at *9 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010). 
137. See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1285–86 (10th Cir. 
2009); Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009). 
138. See In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1285–86; In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627. 
139. One court questioned whether the cost of an emergency appendectomy might be covered 
as a PMSI under the prevailing PMSI interpretation, assuming that the debtor would not have made it 
to the car dealer‘s lot without it.  In re Westfall, 365 B.R. 755, 762 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2007); see 
also In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1286 (―An automobile dealer who attempted to refinance unrelated 
antecedent debt and secure the new debt with the new car would present a question wholly different 
from the question presented here.‖). 
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The courts are also hung up on the fact that a debtor does not retain 
possession of the trade-in.  In In re Vega, the debtors still owed a little over 
$2,000 on a Kia when they decided to purchase a Dodge Intrepid.
140
  The 
creditor agreed to roll the remaining $2,000 into the loan for the Dodge and 
release its security interest in the Kia, but the debtors kept the Kia.
141
  The 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas refused to accord purchase 
money status to the $2,000 the creditor rolled into the new loan because the 
amount did not make it possible for the debtors to acquire rights in the 
Intrepid.
142
  The Tenth Circuit cited In re Vega as an example of unrelated 
antecedent debt, but it provided no explanation for why the result should be 
different whether the debtor keeps the old car or gives it to the dealer.
143
  In 
both circumstances the creditor is extinguishing a preexisting security interest 
on a vehicle in which it has absolutely no interest. 
The Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that debt from a source other than 
negative equity on a trade-in would ever be present in a car loan.
144
  ―The 
Prices present no comparable reason why people would fold their credit card 
or other debts into the purchase of a car, or why car dealers or lenders would 
be eager to permit them to do so.‖145  But it is not hard to imagine an eager car 
dealer wanting to help a debtor qualify for a car loan by paying off her 
overdue credit card balance.  The Fourth Circuit seems to acknowledge that 
the credit card balance would not be a PMSI without providing any 
explanation why a balance on the trade-in car is any different than the credit 
card balance. 
The Eleventh Circuit emphasized that its holding extended only to 
―reasonable, bona fide negative equity in the trade-in vehicle.‖146  The court 
stated that the result might be different if ―there is evidence of subterfuge 
relating to an unrelated antecedent debt.‖147  The Eleventh Circuit failed to 
explain, however, what would constitute an ―unrelated antecedent debt.‖ 
Let‘s imagine that a debtor owned her vehicle free and clear of any liens.  
She then borrowed money to take a vacation and granted the lender a security 
interest in the vehicle.  A year later the debtor decides to trade in the vehicle 
 
140. In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 617–18 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. at 623. 
143. In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1286; see also In re Myers, 393 B.R. 616, 622 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 
2008) (―Had the Debtor here kept the Jeep Wrangler, the Court would have reached a different result, 
for the part of the loan that was used to pay off the Jeep Wrangler did not enable the Debtor to 
acquire rights in the Caliber, it merely paid off an existing debt on the Wrangler.‖) 
144. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 627 (4th Cir. 2009). 
145. Id. 
146. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1303 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008). 
147. Id. 
2010] NEGATIVE EQUITY 1241 
for a new one, but the debtor owes more on the vacation loan than the value of 
her car.  The dealership agrees to allow the debtor to wrap the negative equity 
into her new loan.  The question is whether the circuit courts would agree that 
the negative equity in this case—from an entirely unrelated loan used to take a 
vacation—is not purchase money.  The Eleventh Circuit‘s statement seems to 
indicate that the court would not consider the negative equity in that situation 
to be purchase money.  So why do the courts consider negative equity from 
loans like the one in Lisa‘s case to be purchase money and thus closely related 
to the purchase of the new collateral?  Negative equity does not have a ―close 
nexus‖ to the purchase of a new car simply because the negative equity 
originated from the purchase of another car. 
4.  Commercial Practices 
Finally, many of the circuit courts reason that allowing negative equity to 
be a PMSI accords with the goals of the U.C.C.
148
  Section 1-103 states that 
the U.C.C. ―must be liberally construed . . . to promote its underlying 
purposes and policies, which [include] . . . [permitting] the continued 
expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of 
the parties.‖149  The financing of negative equity in new car purchase 
transactions has become commonplace,
150
 but it is not necessarily a practice 
that should be promoted and encouraged.
151
  The bankruptcy court in In re 
Pajot suggested that the inclusion of negative equity in a new car loan is 
imprudent borrowing and imprudent lending.
152
  And Judge Bye of the Eighth 
Circuit noted that commercial practices cannot change the character of the 
negative equity debt: ―Negative equity is an antecedent unsecured debt and 
cannot be transformed into a purchase money obligation secured by a PMSI 
by rolling it into the loan [for the vehicle].‖153  Moreover, the drafters of the 
2001 revision to the U.C.C. were likely aware of the practice and deliberately 
chose not to include negative equity in the list of examples in Comment 3 to 
section 9-103.
154
 
 
148. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 857–58 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Reiber v. GMAC, LLC (In re Peaslee), 585 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2009); In re Price, 562 F.3d at 627–28. 
149. U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (2001). 
150. One study found that nearly 40% of all new car buyers have negative equity on their  
trade-in.  Danny Hakim, Owing More on an Auto than It’s Worth as a Trade-In, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 27, 2004, at C1. 
151. See In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 165 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007).  Chief Judge Tice also 
suggested that such unsound financial practices contribute to the reasons that debtors end up in his 
courtroom.  Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 
2009) (Bye, J., dissenting). 
154. In 2001, approximately one in four new car buyers had negative equity on their trade-in.  
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B.  Congressional Intent 
Though unnecessary, the circuit courts have often looked to congressional 
intent to discern the meaning of ―purchase money security interest.‖  With 
regard to the hanging paragraph, there is no doubt that ―Congress was 
attempting to remedy a perceived abuse by those who buy vehicles on credit 
on the eve of bankruptcy and then utilize the cramdown provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code to pay the secured creditor a lesser amount than its full 
claim.‖155  Thus, the court in In re Petrocci concluded that the ―primary 
purpose‖ of the hanging paragraph is to disallow bifurcation of unsecured 
negative equity debt, requiring the car creditor to be ―paid in full to the 
detriment of other unsecured creditors.‖156 
But looking to federal congressional intent in enacting the hanging 
paragraph ignores several important issues.  First, by using a term defined in 
the U.C.C., Congress cannot alter the meaning of the term without providing a 
specific definition of the term in the Bankruptcy Code.  Second, the hanging 
paragraph represents a compromise between car creditors and credit card 
creditors because the new ―means test‖ would force more consumer debtors 
into Chapter 13 instead of Chapter 7 bankruptcy, which is more favorable for 
car creditors.  Third, the hanging paragraph protects the unique position of the 
car lender, whose collateral rapidly depreciates the moment the debtor takes 
possession.  Finally, such a liberal reading of the hanging paragraph is not 
compatible with fundamental bankruptcy policy. 
1.  Congress Cannot Alter the Meaning of PMSI 
First and foremost, federal legislative history seems largely irrelevant to 
the negative equity question.  As I noted above, a PMSI is a property right 
that is defined by state law—and state law alone—unless Congress alters it.157  
The plain language of the hanging paragraph suggests that those attempting to 
interpret the meaning of ―purchase money security interest‖ should proceed 
directly to state law because Congress provided no separate definition for the 
term in the Bankruptcy Code.  Congress used a term that already had a 
defined meaning outside the Bankruptcy Code, and, more importantly, that 
term involves a specific property interest, which is almost always a matter of 
state law.  Thus, courts should be interpreting the phrase as a matter of state 
law—congressional intent regarding the phrase is irrelevant, unless Congress 
meant to redefine the scope of a PMSI. 
The circuit courts looking to congressional intent have concluded that 
 
See Hakim, supra note 150. 
155. In re Payne, 347 B.R. 278, 281 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2006). 
156. In re Petrocci, 370 B.R. 489, 502 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2007). 
157. See supra Part II.C. 
2010] NEGATIVE EQUITY 1243 
Congress intended that PMSI have a broad meaning in the hanging paragraph.  
They arrive at this conclusion by noting that the section of the BAPCPA that 
includes the hanging paragraph is titled ―Giving Secured Creditors Fair 
Treatment in Chapter 13.‖158  In addition, the subsection containing the 
language for the hanging paragraph begins with the phrase ―Restoring the 
Foundation for Secured Credit.‖159  Because of the new protections offered by 
the hanging paragraph, the courts reason that Congress could have meant only 
good things for creditors.
160
  While Congress may have intended only good 
things for creditors, congressional intent did not explicitly expand the 
definition of PMSI beyond the state law meaning of the term.
161
 
To date, no court has attempted to discern the intent of the U.C.C. drafters 
regarding the breadth of a PMSI.  Furthermore, none have attempted to 
examine state legislative history.  If the scope of PMSI is murky enough to 
examine legislative history, courts should be examining state legislative 
history (and U.C.C. drafting history), not federal legislative history.  Federal 
legislative history could be used to discern whether Congress intended to 
follow the state law rule for PMSI or create a federal rule.  But it is hard to 
understand why the circuit courts rely on the U.C.C. and state law in 
concluding that negative equity can be part of a PMSI while at the same time 
concluding that the result is supported by federal legislative history. 
2.  The Hanging Paragraph Compromise 
The most fundamental change in existing bankruptcy policy introduced by 
the BAPCPA was the ―means test‖ for Chapter 7 debtors.162  The vast 
majority of consumer debtors will choose between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
bankruptcy.  In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a debtor without significant assets can 
have most of his debts discharged and come out of bankruptcy relatively 
unscathed within six to nine months.  In Chapter 13, however, the debtor must 
pay a portion of his income to his creditors every month for either three or 
 
158. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 
§ 306, 119 Stat. 23, 80. 
159. Id. § 306(b). 
160. Graupner v. Nuvell Credit Corp. (In re Graupner), 537 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir. 2008).  
The courts must make inferences regarding Congress‘s intent because the legislative history 
regarding the hanging paragraph is sparse.  See In re Hayes, 376 B.R. 655 add. at 676–84 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 2007), for a complete legislative history of the paragraph.  Judge Lundin‘s overview 
includes several versions of the hanging paragraph, but the legislative history does not include any 
committee reports or other policy statements that would allow any insight into Congress‘s 
motivations.  But see William C. Whitford, A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of 
BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 143. 
161. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mierkowski (In re Mierkowski), 580 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 
2009) (Bye, J., dissenting). 
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006); Charles J. Tabb & Jillian K. McClelland, Living with the 
Means Test, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 463, 505 (2007). 
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five years.  The means test forces debtors with the ability to sustain a payment 
plan into Chapter 13.  The credit card creditors and other unsecured creditors 
obtain a better return in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy because at least a portion of 
the debt will be repaid through the life of the Chapter 13 plan. 
Car creditors did not fare as well in Chapter 13 before BAPCPA.  If a 
Chapter 7 debtor wants to retain possession of a car that is not paid off, he has 
three options: (1) redeem the car by paying the full amount due on the loan; 
(2) surrender the car, which would allow the creditor to sell the car, apply the 
proceeds to the outstanding balance, and file an unsecured claim for the 
remainder; or (3) reaffirm the debt.
163
  Most debtors are unable to redeem the 
car by paying in full (else why would they be in Chapter 7?), nor do they want 
to surrender their car to the creditor to pay the debt, so most debtors sign a 
reaffirmation agreement.  The reaffirmation agreement commonly provides 
that the debtor will repay the entire amount owing, with interest, so the car 
creditor emerges from the debtor‘s bankruptcy in relatively the same position 
it was in prior to the bankruptcy.
164
  In contrast, prior to BAPCPA, the 
Chapter 13 car creditor could expect to take a big hit due to the debtor‘s 
ability to cram down the loan.
165
  The creditor would receive the market value 
of the collateral plus pennies on the dollar for the remaining unsecured 
deficiency.
166
 
Because the means test was going to force many more potential Chapter 7 
debtors into Chapter 13, the car creditors could expect to lose a lot of money 
on crammed-down loans.
167
  At the behest of the car creditors, Senator 
Spencer Abraham from Michigan introduced the hanging paragraph during a 
meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
168
 
Surprisingly, the amendment prompted little public criticism from credit 
card issuers or other large groups of unsecured creditors.
169
  The credit card 
 
163. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2).  Prior to BAPCPA, the debtor had a fourth option: do nothing.  If 
the debtor was current on her payments, the car loan would quietly ―ride-through‖ the bankruptcy 
without change.  Braucher, supra note 33, at 475–77.  The ride-through option was rejected by many 
courts, however, and some creditors did not like it because, while the creditor retained a lien on the 
vehicle, the debtor‘s personal obligation to pay was discharged in the bankruptcy.  Whitford, supra 
note 160, at 148–49.  The continued validity of this fourth option after BAPCPA remains to be seen.  
See Christopher M. Hogan, Note, Will the Ride-Through Ride Again?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 882, 
925–26 (2008) (arguing that the ride-through should continue as a viable option post-BAPCPA). 
164. Whitford, supra note 160, at 144–46.  The car creditor has superior bargaining power in 
negotiating reaffirmation agreements because the debtor will not be able to easily replace her car if 
she surrenders it to the car creditor due to her impaired credit rating.  Id. at 145. 
165. Id. at 145–46. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 146. 
168. Id. at 177.  Though many expected some sort of protection for car creditors in Chapter 13, 
the amendment was not circulated before the meeting and was introduced as a surprise.  Id. at 178. 
169. Id. at 178–79. 
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issuers must have realized that they would not be able to force so many more 
debtors into Chapter 13 without giving some sort of consolation to car 
creditors.  The hanging paragraph must be seen for what it is—a compromise 
between car creditors and unsecured creditors.  Increasing the amount of a 
secured debt that a debtor must pay through her Chapter 13 plan means that 
less of the debtor‘s funds will be available to pay unsecured creditors through 
the plan.  If the unsecured creditors had known that the car creditors would 
use the hanging paragraph to substantially increase the amount of their 
secured claims (by almost 50% in Lisa Weiser‘s case), they might have fought 
harder to clarify the narrow meaning of ―purchase money security interest.‖ 
In his dissent from the Tenth Circuit‘s opinion, Judge Tymkovich noted 
that ―purchase money security interest‖ did not appear in early versions of the 
hanging paragraph.
170
  One early bill would have protected only the ―unpaid 
balance of the purchase price‖ from cramdown, while another would have 
protected ―an allowed claim that is secured under applicable non-bankruptcy 
law.‖171  The former would protect only the sticker price of the car, and the 
latter would protect the car creditor‘s entire claim, including negative equity.  
The language that Congress ultimately settled on represents a compromise and 
suggests that Congress did not intend to protect from cramdown every dollar 
of a car creditor‘s claim. 
The Fourth Circuit worried that excluding negative equity from the car 
creditors‘ secured claims ―would nullify the treatment that Congress intended 
for a large percentage of vehicle debts.‖172  But the court misconstrued the 
effect of holding that negative equity cannot form the basis of a PMSI.  Even 
if negative equity is not a PMSI, the creditor still has a PMSI for the rest of 
the purchase price.  Only the negative equity portion will be ―stripped‖ off of 
the lien.  Congress‘s intent in protecting car creditors will still be realized by 
protecting their interest to the extent of the purchase price of the car.
173
 
3.  The Unique Position of Car Creditors 
Car lenders are unique among secured creditors.  Their collateral 
decreases in value significantly the moment the borrower takes possession.
174
  
 
170. See Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1293–94 (10th Cir. 
2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting). 
171. Id. at 1293 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
172. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 628 (4th Cir. 2009). 
173. Judge Tymkovich indicated that use of the term ―purchase money security interest‖ 
―might have reflected a Congressional compromise to protect certain fees that are properly 
considered part of a purchase-money loan—i.e., fees akin to transaction costs—and not to protect 
negative equity.‖  In re Ford, 574 F.3d at 1293–94. 
174. See William C. Wood, The Cost of Driving a Car Off the Dealer’s Lot, 28 J. CONSUMER 
AFF. 130, 130 (1994).  Wood notes that a car‘s value can decrease by as much as 25% as soon as the 
buyer takes possession.  Id. 
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Prior to BAPCPA, a debtor could buy a brand-new car one day and file 
bankruptcy the next.  The debtor then would be able to cram down the car 
loan to the value of the car and realize thousands of dollars in savings on the 
loan.  Congress enacted the hanging paragraph to prevent this sort of ―abuse[] 
created by spendthrift debtors.‖175  But there is a big difference between a 
―normal‖ car loan and one that includes negative equity in the financing: the 
car financed with a loan that includes negative equity is ―underwater‖ even 
before the borrower drives it off the lot.  In Lisa‘s case, the Pontiac‘s sticker 
price was around $14,000, but it carried a debt of over $26,000 before she 
even drove away with it.
176
  Certainly Congress could not have meant to 
protect a lender that is undersecured before the buyer takes possession. 
A provision similar to the hanging paragraph prohibits modification of a 
mortgage on the debtor‘s principal residence.177  As a result of the recent 
downturn in housing prices, many homes are now worth less than the 
mortgages they secure.
178
  In light of the situation, several members of 
Congress proposed bills that would allow homeowners in Chapter 13 to cram 
down their home mortgages to the value of the home.
179
  As of this writing, the 
mortgage industry has been successful in its opposition to these bills.  But the 
fact that many members of Congress are sympathetic to these underwater home 
mortgages signifies that Congress did not intend only good things for creditors. 
Unlike mortgage creditors, car creditors expect their collateral to 
depreciate rather than appreciate.  Car creditors do not extend a loan that 
includes negative equity expecting that the automobile will appreciate in value 
and the creditor will become fully secured.  Rather, the value of the 
automobile is expected to depreciate over the life of the loan.  While the 
creditor does technically have a security interest for the entire amount of the 
 
175. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Peaslee, 373 B.R. 252, 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2007). 
176. Admittedly, the potential for abuse still exists if negative equity is not a PMSI and thus not 
protected by the hanging paragraph.  Under my approach to negative equity, Lisa could have 
discharged as unsecured debt over $9,000 of negative equity if she filed bankruptcy the day after she 
purchased the Pontiac.  By crying ―abuse,‖ however, the creditors escape liability for making such a 
bad loan.  The car dealer financed such a large amount of negative equity that it represented over 
70% of the Pontiac‘s value.  Creditors making such risky loans should not be protected by placing 
the blame on the debtors.  If Community America had repossessed the Pontiac, and sued Lisa for the 
deficiency before Lisa filed for bankruptcy, all of that negative equity would be an unsecured (and 
therefore dischargeable) claim. 
177. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006). 
178. David Roeder & Francine Knowles, Read ’em—and Weep: Collapse in Housing Market 
Leaves Many Who Bought in Last 2 Years Owing More Than Property Worth, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 
12, 2008, at 2 (noting that by 2008, 37.8% of Chicago-area homeowners who purchased homes in 
2006 owed more than their homes were worth). 
179. Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. 
(2009); Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, H.R. 1106, 111th Cong. (2009); Helping 
Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2008, S. 2136, 110th Cong. (2007). 
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loan, the creditor is rarely fully secured.  For most of the life of the loan, the 
balance due on the loan will be more than the value of the collateral. 
This is a risky position for the car creditor.  If the debtor defaults without 
filing bankruptcy, the creditor will not be paid in full after foreclosing on its 
collateral and must turn to the debtor—who has already defaulted—for payment 
of the unsecured deficiency amount.  When the creditor cannot collect the 
deficiency, it is forced to write off the bad debt.  The precarious position of the 
car creditor is only enhanced by inclusion of negative equity in a car loan. 
4.  Bankruptcy Policy 
The PMSI interpretation of the hanging paragraph is not compatible with 
bankruptcy policy.  Bankruptcy proceedings serve two purposes: they provide 
troubled debtors with a ―fresh start,‖ and they treat all similarly situated 
creditors equally when distributing a bankrupt‘s assets.180 
In a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, debtors can pay off their secured debt, pay a 
percentage of their unsecured debt, and have most of the remaining debts 
discharged.  If Chapter 13 debtors are required to pay the full amount due on 
their car loans, including the negative equity, they will be prevented from 
obtaining the fresh start that a bankruptcy filing is supposed to give them.
181
  
Instead, a monthly car payment that includes the negative equity balance may 
be so high that the debtor is forced to surrender the car.  The Fourth Circuit 
asserted that any argument that Chapter 13 debtors would be forced to 
surrender their cars if they cannot bifurcate the negative equity is ―necessarily 
speculative.‖182  Nevertheless, after Judge Federman ruled that the over 
$9,000 in negative equity had to be paid through her Chapter 13 plan, Lisa 
Weiser was forced to surrender her car.
183
 
 
180. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
BANKRUPTCY UNDER THE ACT OF CONGRESS OF 1898 AND ITS AMENDMENTS § 3, at 7 (The 
Lawbook Exchange 3d ed. 2006) (1922); see also DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 
(INCLUDING BAPCPA): 21ST CENTURY DEBTOR–CREDITOR LAW 41–42 (2d ed. 2006). 
181. The phrase ―fresh start‖ does not appear in the bankruptcy code; ―[c]ourts and 
commentators however consistently connect the bankruptcy ‗fresh start‘ policy with the bankruptcy 
discharge.‖  EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 180, at 42; see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286–87 
(1991) (noting that the policy behind bankruptcy is to provide a ―fresh start‖ for the ―honest but 
unfortunate debtor‖) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
182. Wells Fargo Fin. Acceptance v. Price (In re Price), 562 F.3d 618, 629 (4th Cir. 2009).  To 
be fair, the car creditors have their own parade of horribles, arguing that not including negative 
equity in PMSI will make it harder for consumers to buy cars because lenders will be resistant to 
financing negative equity.  Id.  
183. In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263, 265 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2007); Amendment to Chapter 13 Plan 
at 1, In re Weiser, 381 B.R. 263 (No. 07-40714).  An issue outside the scope of this Comment is 
whether Community America would then receive an unsecured claim in the bankruptcy for the 
deficiency amount after it sold the RAV4 and applied the proceeds to the remaining balance.  There 
is a split in the circuits on this issue, but the Eighth Circuit has ruled that the creditor is allowed to 
file an unsecured claim for the deficiency.  AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Moore, 517 F.3d. 987, 989 
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In addition, debtors that cannot afford the higher monthly payment as a 
result of the inclusion of negative equity may choose to convert to a Chapter 7 
liquidation.  Many debtors that may otherwise qualify to file for Chapter 7 
bankruptcy under BAPCPA‘s means test file Chapter 13 instead in an effort to 
save their house or car.
184
  This means that unsecured creditors that may have 
received a small distribution through a Chapter 13 will likely receive nothing 
if the debtor files bankruptcy under Chapter 7. 
Furthermore, ―bankruptcy law is not designed to fundamentally alter 
property rights.  Instead, ‗a bankruptcy proceeding is principally a forum in 
which all of a debtor‘s creditors can gather, assemble the debtor‘s assets, and 
divide them among themselves.‘‖185  Allowing lenders to recover their full 
claim for negative equity using the hanging paragraph will favor the car 
lender over other unsecured creditors.  The original purpose of the cramdown 
provisions of § 506(a) was to allow debt that was essentially unsecured to be 
treated that way.  A secured creditor whose collateral is worth less than the 
outstanding amount owed is really an unsecured creditor with regard to the 
deficiency.  The hanging paragraph acts against this bankruptcy policy to 
allow car creditors to recover what would be unsecured debt in a foreclosure 
proceeding.
186
  A Chapter 13 debtor only has so much income.  In most cases 
unsecured creditors will receive a very small distribution in the proceedings.  
By allowing the car creditor to assert a much larger secured claim than it 
would otherwise receive, the other creditors are swindled out of their meager 
distributions.  The car creditor should not receive a greater distribution than 
other unsecured creditors on what is essentially an unsecured claim. 
IV.  ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE NEGATIVE EQUITY DEBATE 
A.  Dual Status vs. Transformation Rule 
The bankruptcy courts that adopted the non-PMSI interpretation of 
 
(8th Cir. 2008); Capital One Auto Fin. v. Osborn, 515 F.3d 817, 822–23 (8th Cir. 2008).  Lisa‘s 
Chapter 13 plan provided for a zero percent dividend to unsecured creditors, so even though 
Community America was allowed an unsecured claim in Lisa‘s bankruptcy after surrender and sale, 
the bank received nothing on the unsecured deficiency amount.  The bank therefore recovered much 
less than it would have if Lisa had been allowed to cram down the car loan to the sticker price she 
paid for the Pontiac and pay Community America‘s secured claim through her Chapter 13 plan. 
184. See Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to 
Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 459–60 (1999). 
185. Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).  See also Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 346 (1874) 
(noting that the most important purpose of bankruptcy is equality of distribution). 
186. To be sure, the car creditor that finances negative equity and takes a security interest has 
that security interest until the debtor pays the last dime of her obligation to the creditor.  But when a 
creditor is undersecured and the debtor defaults, which is essentially the result in bankruptcy, the 
undersecured creditor is left with debt that is unsecured after the value of the collateral is applied to 
reduce the debt. 
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negative equity are split as to the effect of the presence of the non-PMSI 
negative equity portion in the loan.  The first group adopts the ―dual status‖ 
rule, holding that the negative equity portion of the financing is not a PMSI 
and is not protected by the hanging paragraph, but the remainder of the 
amount due the car lender is purchase money.
187
  The second adopts the 
―transformation‖ rule, holding that the presence of a non-purchase money 
component transforms the entire balance into a non-PMSI.
188
 
The U.C.C. provides some guidance on the issue, but only for non-
consumer goods transactions.  Section 9-103(f) provides that ―a purchase-
money security interest does not lose its status as such, even if the purchase-
money collateral also secures an obligation that is not a purchase-money 
obligation.‖  For consumer goods transactions, the U.C.C. directs the courts to 
determine the proper rules.
189
  Eight states have opted to eliminate the 
consumer/non-consumer goods distinction in the U.C.C., applying the dual 
status rule to all transactions.
190
 
If the dual status rule is applied, the portion of the debt that originally 
qualified as a PMSI, i.e., the portion that represents the purchase price for the 
new car, remains as a PMSI to the extent of the purchase price of the collateral 
(along with the enumerated expenses in Comment 3).
191
  The portion of the debt 
representing the PMSI is subject to the provisions of the hanging paragraph.
192
  
In Lisa‘s case above, $19,219.60 would represent the PMSI subject to the 
provisions of the hanging paragraph.
193
  The negative equity of $9,031.64 
 
187. See, e.g., Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 392 B.R. 835, 860 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2008), aff’d by AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), No. 08-60037, 2010 
U.S. App. LEXIS 14588 (9th Cir. July 16, 2010) (circuit court did not reach the dual status question); 
Nuvell Credit Co. v. Callicott (In re Callicott), 396 B.R. 506, 510 (E.D. Mo. 2008); Citifinancial 
Auto v. Hernandez-Simpson, 369 B.R. 36, 48 (D. Kan. 2007); In re Crawford, 397 B.R. 461, 468 
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008); In re Johnson, 380 B.R. 236, 250 (Bankr. D. Or. 2007); In re Hayes, 376 
B.R. 655, 676 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 165 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); 
In re Acaya, 369 B.R. 564, 571 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007); In re Vega, 344 B.R. 616, 623 (Bankr. 
D. Kan. 2006). 
188. See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 379 B.R. 131, 142 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2007); In re Blakeslee, 
377 B.R. 724, 731 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2007); In re Hunt, No. 07-20627, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 2709, at 
*7 (Bankr. D. Kan. Aug. 14, 2007); In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 746 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007). 
189. U.C.C. § 9-103(h) (2001). 
190. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1031(6) (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-103(f) (2001); 
IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-103(f) (LexisNexis 2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-103(f) (Supp. 
2008); MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW. § 9-103(f) (LexisNexis 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-103(f) 
(2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-03(6) (Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-103(f) (2004).  
These statutes eliminate the phrase ―other than a consumer-goods transaction‖ appearing in 
sections 9-103(e), (f), and (g), as well as the consumer goods caveat in section 9-103(h). 
191. In re Acaya, 369 B.R. at 570. 
192. Id. at 571. 
193. Community America‘s claim of $28,251.24 minus $9,031.64 for the negative equity.  
Under Comment 3 to U.C.C. section 9-103, the interest charges and costs of collection are a PMSI.  
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would be an unsecured claim paid pro rata with the other unsecured claims. 
If the transformation rule is applied, the entire amount financed becomes a 
non-PMSI.
194
  Therefore, it does not meet the requirements of the hanging 
paragraph and it would be subject to cramdown under § 506(a).  In Lisa‘s case, 
the Pontiac would be subject to valuation; Community America would receive 
a secured claim for the market value of the Pontiac at the time of the filing of 
the bankruptcy petition; and the remainder of the claim would be unsecured. 
At least one court proposed to exempt a claim including negative equity 
from the provisions of the hanging paragraph.
195
  The theory is that the 
hanging paragraph only applies when the entire claim is a PMSI.
196
  The 
hanging paragraph provides that § 506(a) does not apply ―if‖ the claim is a 
PMSI, not ―to the extent that‖ the claim is a PMSI.197  If Congress meant to 
allow the hanging paragraph to apply to only part of a claim, it would have 
used the phrase ―to the extent that‖ because that phrase is used in a number of 
other places in the Bankruptcy Code.
198
  This approach would eviscerate the 
hanging paragraph because so many car purchases include negative equity.  
The best approach, and the one I advocate below, is to apply the hanging 
paragraph to the purchase money portion of the creditor‘s claim. 
I believe the dual status rule, rather than the transformation rule, best 
harmonizes Congress‘s intent in enacting the hanging paragraph and the 
actual status of the creditor‘s security interest.  If Lisa had simply surrendered 
the Pontiac, instead of filing bankruptcy, Community America would have 
had an unsecured claim for the negative equity and any other deficiency 
amount owed above the fair market value of the car.
199
  The hanging 
paragraph was enacted to prevent perceived abuses by debtors that purchased 
new cars and then filed bankruptcy only a short time later; and in doing so, it 
leaves the motor vehicle creditor in a somewhat better position than it would 
be outside of bankruptcy.  The transformation rule destroys any effect of the 
hanging paragraph, which almost certainly defies congressional intent. 
The dual status rule is also supported in the text of the U.C.C.   
Section 9-103(b)(1) provides that ―a security interest in goods is a purchase-
money security interest to the extent that the goods are purchase-money 
collateral with respect to that security interest.‖200  Though Congress did not 
use the phrase ―to the extent that‖ in the hanging paragraph, it is in the U.C.C.  
 
U.C.C. § 9-103 cmt. 3 (2001). 
194. In re Price, 363 B.R. 734, 745 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007). 
195. See In re Sanders, 377 B.R. 836, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 859–60. 
198. Id. at 860. 
199. See AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. v. Moore, 517 F.3d. 987, 989 (8th Cir. 2008). 
200. U.C.C. § 9-103(b)(1) (2001). 
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The use of the phrase suggests that a creditor can have a PMSI and another 
security interest in the same collateral.  The PMSI extends only as far as the 
purchase money component of the security interest.  Any further funds 
secured by the collateral are not purchase money. 
Further, revised Article 9 adopts the dual status rule for non-consumer 
goods.  Section 9-103(f)(1) provides that ―in a transaction other than a 
consumer-goods transaction, a purchase-money security interest does not lose 
its status as such, even if the purchase-money collateral also secures an 
obligation that is not a purchase-money obligation.‖201  The U.C.C. leaves to 
courts the determination of whether to apply the dual status or transformation 
rule in consumer goods transactions.
202
  When they enacted revised Article 9, 
several states explicitly adopted the dual status rule for consumer goods 
transactions as well as non-consumer goods transactions.
203
 
A bright line dual status rule also best aligns with the realities of a 
bankruptcy practice.  Some courts have suggested that, in accordance with the 
suggestion of section 9-103(h) of the U.C.C., the court should have the 
discretion in each case to determine whether the dual status or transformation 
rules should apply.
204
  But a rule that allows discretion is an invitation to 
litigation in a forum where the parties can hardly afford to be there in the first 
place, much less litigate over which rule to apply. 
The Seventh Circuit indicated that the hanging paragraph eliminated what 
was, before BAPCPA, a valuation problem for car creditors.
205
  The 
bankruptcy court no longer has to attempt to value the creditor‘s collateral by 
simply providing that the entire claim is secured as long as it is a PMSI.  The 
Seventh Circuit expressed concern that excluding negative equity from the 
reach of the hanging paragraph would restore the previous valuation 
problems.
206
  Yet with the dual status rule, the valuation problem is still cured.  
The creditor has a PMSI (not subject to cramdown) for the full purchase price 
of the car.  It is only the negative equity that would be crammed down—the 
creditor‘s secured claim still is likely to far exceed the actual value of the 
car.
207
 
 
201. U.C.C. § 9-103(f)(1). 
202. U.C.C. § 9-103(h). 
203. See supra note 190. 
204. In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 157–58 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007). 
205. Howard v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs. (In re Howard), 597 F.3d 852, 854 (7th Cir. 2010).  
Section 506(a)(2) provides that the court determines the replacement value of the car when § 506 is 
used to bifurcate the loan into secured and unsecured components.  11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2) (2006).  If 
the court values the car too low, the creditor is worse off because its claim is undervalued.  If the 
court values the car too high, the debtor might be encouraged to surrender the car instead of paying 
an amount that exceeds the car‘s value.  In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 854. 
206. In re Howard, 597 F.3d at 858. 
207. The Seventh Circuit noted that had the negative equity been stripped from the creditor‘s 
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B.  Payment Application Considerations 
After determining that the negative equity portion of the loan is not a 
PMSI, the courts next face the arduous process of determining the amount of 
the secured claim that is protected by the hanging paragraph.
208
  The court 
cannot simply subtract the negative equity from the amount of the loan 
because the debtor will likely have made payments on the loan between the 
financing date and the petition date.
209
  The U.C.C. indicates a default rule for 
application of payments.
210
  Payments should be applied according to the 
contract between the parties, but, in the absence of a previous agreement, 
payments should be applied first to the portion of the loan secured by a 
PMSI.
211
 
Although most states have a standard motor vehicle retail installment sale 
contract, it is possible that the agreement between the parties could contain any 
number of instructions for payment allocation.  At least one court has indicated 
that in the absence of a clear contract indicating the amount of negative equity 
and the application of payments, it would apply the transformation rule instead 
of the dual status rule.
212
  This approach would be unwise and certainly would 
not fulfill Congress‘s intent in enacting the hanging paragraph.  Therefore, the 
bankruptcy courts should not adopt either a default or discretionary rule, but 
simply follow the instructions given in the U.C.C.
213
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The majority of the circuit courts holding that negative equity can be a 
 
PMSI, AmeriCredit would still have a claim of about $27,000 on a car that was worth approximately 
$24,000.  Id. 
208. See, e.g., In re Conyers, 379 B.R 576, 583 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2007). 
209. A related issue is how to allocate the PMSI when negative equity has been financed many 
times over.  The Los Angeles Times reported the story of one couple that had traded in their cars and 
refinanced negative equity five times in the previous three years.  Ken Bensinger, New Cars that Are 
Fully Loaded—With Debt,  L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2007, at A1. 
210. U.C.C. § 9-103(e)(3)(B) (2001). 
211. Id.; see also Ford v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1290 (10th Cir. 
2009) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (advocating that courts simply use the default rules set out in the 
U.C.C. for payment application questions). 
212. In re Pajot, 371 B.R. 139, 157–58 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); see also Dienna Ching, Does 
Negative Equity Negate the Hanging Paragraph?, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 507–10 
(2008).  Ching argues that the transformation rule should be the default rule in the absence of 
carefully drafted contract language that carves out the negative equity portion of the debt and 
specifically provides for payment allocation.  Id. 
213. A related issue may arise when the market value of the car on the date of filing exceeds 
the purchase money portion of the claim.  This situation would be resolved by simply using the value 
of the car, allowing negative equity to be added to the claim to the extent of the car‘s value.  Any 
remaining negative equity would be an unsecured claim.  This formulation is consistent with the 
parties‘ rights under state law.  The lender would realize only the value of the car and could assert the 
remainder as an unsecured deficiency claim. 
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PMSI blur the line between a security interest and a PMSI.  They seem 
determined to protect the secured status of the negative equity portion, while 
ignoring the fact that, even if the creditor does not have a PMSI in the 
negative equity portion of the loan, the lender still has a security interest in the 
car.
214
  The car is encumbered until the loan is paid.  It does not matter if the 
debtor defaults when the balance is $20,000, $2,000 or $200—the lender still 
has its collateral if the loan is in default.  So although the negative equity 
portion of the loan destroys the purchase money nature of that particular 
portion of the security interest, the lender still has a security interest in the 
vehicle (outside of bankruptcy) until every dollar, including the negative 
equity, is paid back to the creditor. 
In the wake of the financial crisis predicated on poor consumer lending 
practices, unwise transactions that leave a creditor tremendously undersecured 
and a consumer saddled with an unbearable loan should not be condoned by a 
process that prides itself on consistency and fairness.  The bankruptcy process 
is designed to provide overburdened debtors with a fresh start by discharging 
their obligations while allowing similarly situated creditors an equal 
distribution of the bankrupt‘s assets.  While it is true that BAPCPA attempts 
to cure and deter some of the most egregious abuses of the bankruptcy system, 
the stripping of negative equity from an auto loan is not one of them. 
Debtors should be allowed to cram down the negative equity portion of 
their car loans, allowing the creditor an unsecured claim for the negative 
equity portion.  This solution best allows Chapter 13 debtors to keep their 
cars—instruments that, for many debtors, allow them to keep working—and 
finish their payment plans.  It also provides for equal distribution among 
claimants that are in the same position.  Perhaps Congress meant to include 
negative equity in the definition of ―purchase money security interest,‖ but 
until Congress clarifies the term by inserting an unambiguous definition into 
the Bankruptcy Code, federal courts are left to apply a term from the U.C.C. 
that was never intended to have meaning outside of the priority scheme set up 
by Article 9.  Though eight circuit courts have ruled on this issue, the 
continuing dissents and the recent decision reached by the Ninth Circuit 
suggest that the answer to the negative equity question is not as obvious as the 
circuit courts have made it out to be.
215
 
Congress can and should simply define ―purchase money security 
interest‖ in the Bankruptcy Code to clarify the extent to which it meant to 
 
214. Indeed, a vehicle can be used as collateral for most types of consumer loans.  See Ford v. 
Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Ford), 574 F.3d 1279, 1289 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., 
dissenting) (―[T]he Fords and their dealer were free to use the new pickup as security for a loan to 
pay an antecedent debt . . . .‖). 
215. As one court put it, the hanging paragraph ―has become the ‗Rorschach Inkblot Test‘ of 
the bankruptcy bench and bar.‖  In re Busby, 393 B.R. 443, 448 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2008). 
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protect overreaching creditors attempting to claim the protections of purchase 
money status.  One solution might be to use a definition already contained in 
the Bankruptcy Code.  Section 547(c)(3) provides that security interests that 
secure ―new value‖ related to the purchase of collateral cannot be avoided as 
preferences.
216
  ―New value,‖ in turn, is defined as ―money or money‘s worth 
in goods, services, or new credit, . . . but does not include an obligation 
substituted for an existing obligation.‖217  The Ninth Circuit relied on this 
definition when it found that, while the Bankruptcy Code affords preferential 
treatment for certain types of security interests, that treatment is reserved for 
situations when ―the obligation relates to the receipt of truly new value, not 
just old obligations that have been repackaged.‖218 
Until Congress acts, courts faced with this issue should consider the 
purposes behind the protections afforded to purchase money creditors and 
determine whether car creditors should be entitled to these protections for the 
negative equity portion of the loan. 
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